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    Sustaining China’s Economic Growth: New Leaders, New Directions? 
Penelope B. Prime 
(Under review at Eurasian Geography and Economics) 
 
Introduction 
 With costs rising, growth slowing and a new leadership at the national level, the citizens 
of China face many uncertainties.  While progress in many aspects of life has been impressive 
since reforms began, the challenges must seem daunting.   There is much discussion within 
academic and policy circles in China of how to avoid getting stuck in a middle-income trap, 
about whether the current slowdown is primarily due to spillovers from global crises or is more 
fundamental to China’s circumstances, and whether new solutions to old problems will be 
politically and institutionally possible.  For the average person, the TV shows and tabloids dwell 
on measuring happiness and the meaning of life, as well as how to finance a home and obtain the 
best education possible for one’s children.    
 These policy and personal concerns are closely related.  To date, producers have been 
favored over consumers, state companies have been favored over private firms, and production 
of export goods has been favored over provision of household services.    These priorities have 
resulted in mammoth change in China’s economic capabilities and have delivered much 
improved living conditions for many.  However, many analysts inside and outside of China have 
argued that the benefits of these priorities have run their course, and a so-called “re-balancing” of 
the use of resources and policy priorities is in order.   
 The re-balancing discussion is not new.  Coined “harmonious society,” it has been the 
hallmark of the Hu Jintao leadership.   But Hu’s presidency ends with many of the problems left 
unresolved.  The 18th Party Congress selected Xi Jinping and six others to the Politiboro 
Standing Committee, the highest level government group in China, with the economy at the top 
of the list of urgent matters to tackle.  The purpose of this article is to review the reforms leading 
up to Hu’s agenda, to assess how healthy the economy looks at this point, and to speculate on 
what options and obstacles the next leadership team will face.   The thesis argued is that 
achieving more reforms and improving technology will be essential to sustained growth, but that 
it is likely that more reforms will be needed before sustained innovation can take root.   The next 
section will briefly review the development strategies under the three main leaders since reforms, 
Deng, Jiang and Hu, that led to successful growth and engagement with global markets.  The 
third section analyzes pressing problems and possible remedies, arguing that the key drivers of 
growth are exhausted—high savings funding high investment, low population growth and high 




Reform-led Development Strategies  
 Under Mao, socialist goals of security and equity were achieved at the expense of 
incentives for efficiency and innovation.  These goals were taken to extremes during the Great 
Leap Forward campaign (1958-62) to build socialism quickly in the countryside, and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76) that shook up the bureaucratic and institutional status quo.  As a result, 
over time, rather than playing a leading role in the world as Mao had envisioned, China became 
isolated with its economy falling behind other countries in the region.  
Deng Xiaoping launches economic reform   
 Mao’s death in 1976 created the political possibility of following a different approach.   
After struggles within the Chinese Communist Party, supporters of Mao’s strategy were defeated 
and the reformers gained the upper hand, led by Deng Xiaoping.    
 The People’s Daily online has this description relating to Deng’s role in economic 
reform:1 
Following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, he became 
Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, member of the Standing Committee of its 
Political Bureau, Chairman of the Central Military Commission and chairman of the 
Central Advisory Commission. He has played a major role in important policy decisions 
by pointing out the correct orientation with regard to key questions that have arisen in the 
course of formulating the line since that Session. People regard him as the chief architect 
of China's reform.   
 Once Deng consolidated power after Mao’s death, economic growth became the main 
priority.  The Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, in December 1978, is recognized as 
the official beginning of economic reform.  Drawing on previous initial discussions in China on 
reform, Deng characterized the areas of needed change as the “Four Modernizations,” covering 
agriculture, industry, technology and defense.  This created some continuity between the Maoist 
era and the reform period, but the political and ideological challenges of this transition were 
unprecedented.  The economic benefits received by various interest groups at each stage in the 
reform helped push the implementation of the changes and keep them going (Shirk 1993).  Early 
on the collectivized agricultural system was decentralized to the household level, where families 
could contract with the state to use plots of land in return for selling a portion of their output to 
the state at planned prices (Naughton 2007, pp.89-90).  Any surplus could be used by the family 
or sold on the market.  This seemingly simple change caused agricultural output to jump, and 
helped relieve some of the worst poverty and hunger resulting from the stagnating economy in 
                                                          
1 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/people/dengxiaoping.shtml, accessed October 17, 2012. 
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the 1970s.  By some reports grain output was one-third higher in 1984 as compared with 1978.  
These successes also helped to spread this institutional change quickly throughout China. 
 As in agriculture, reforms in industry used a “dual-track” approach where state-owned 
enterprises could increase their production beyond what was required to fulfill the plan targets 
and sell this excess on the market at (usually) higher prices.  This was the beginning of pushing 
managers towards working within a market context, paying attention to costs, quality and market 
demand.  For four decades this type of management was unnecessary and even frowned upon, so 
the change needed in this sector was daunting.  Another enterprise ownership category was 
“collectives,” which meant ownership by local governments such as villages, townships or 
counties.  These enterprises were initially established under the Maoist period as the “small five 
industries” to serve agriculture, and included chemical fertilizer, cement, iron and steel, 
hydroelectric power and farming tools (Naughton 2007, p.273).  In the 1980s, these enterprises 
moved into consumer products and other agricultural and construction inputs, such as bricks, to 
meet these growing demands.  Private enterprises were also established for the first time in many 
decades.  Many of these companies did very well during this period, and helped raise tax revenue 
for local governments and to create wage-paying jobs for members of farming families.  
 As part of the development of capital markets, the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock 
exchanges were established in the early 1990s.  In the beginning only select state companies 
were allowed to issue some of their shares on one of these exchanges.  Trading of shares 
represented partial privatization of these companies, although the government kept majority 
control.  Meanwhile, many small state enterprises and collective enterprises were bought out by 
employees or other private investors, and more home-grown entrepreneurs started private 
companies.  These companies have grown primarily on informal financing channels such as 
borrowing from family and friends, as they have not had full access to bank loans or been able to 
easily list on one of the stock exchanges.  Yasheng Huang argues that this was the peak of 
privatization in China with the most conducive policy environment, and that support for private 
development has dwindled since (Huang 2008). 
 The third modernization, technology, was tackled initially by both importing 
domestically unavailable technology and by sending scientists, scholars and engineers abroad for 
training.  The Maoist approach had been referred to as “walking on two legs,” meaning a dual 
strategy of utilizing basic technology (such as in the rural industrial sector) combined with 
government sponsored research efforts to promote more sophisticated technological 
development.  While the country saw some breakthroughs in scientific achievement, the 
economy overall did not benefit much from innovation or even from dissemination of what was 
already known. 
The defense sector, the fourth part of the Four Modernizations, was most often the 
beneficiary of these technology efforts (Naughton 2007, p.353).  China tested its first atom bomb 
in 1964.  In fact, much of the strategy pursued in China under Mao can be understood better in 
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the context of national defense.  China and the Soviet Union were allies in socialist ideology and 
pursuit of socialism against the capitalist, imperial world until the late 1950s when they parted 
ways.  After that, Mao’s policies looked upon the Soviet Union as an enemy, along with the 
western world.  In the 1960s, Mao insisted on building industry throughout the country—the so-
called “third front”—for defense reasons, and also pushed each province to become 
economically self-sufficient in everything from food and energy to consumer and producer goods 
(Naughton 1988).  These policies were devastating in terms of economic output and efficiency, 
but indeed did build production capacity in remote areas across China.  As part of the initial 
reforms in this sector, many military factories converted production to much desired consumer 
goods such as televisions and bicycles.  Later the military sold or closed these factories, and 
evolved toward a modern, professional military that focuses on national defense and is funded 
via the national budget rather than from its own businesses.    
A very important aspect of reforms in China in the 1980s was the various initiatives to 
open China’s economy to trade and foreign investment.   Mao focused the country on gaining 
self-sufficiency in part due to suspicion of the international, capitalist economy.  As a result, 
China did not participate in international trade and investment for the most part.  Hence, 
allowing foreign investment into China was controversial, to say the least.  To get around this 
ideological constraint, the initial opening reforms created four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
in 1979 in southern China near the border with Hong Kong (Vogel 2011, p.398-99).   
Guangdong and Fujian Provincial leaders were allowed the authority to build infrastructure and 
offer tax and other incentives to encourage foreign firms to invest and export.  These zones had 
their own borders, however, with special permission needed to enter and exit, which helped 
mollify those who were against them.   They were also seen initially as isolated experiments, 
rather than policies for the whole country (Vogel 2011, p.400).  The zones required most of the 
output to be exported, partly because the country had very little foreign exchange at the time and 
partly to protect domestic enterprises.  Hong Kong firms flocked to these zones to manufacture 
with the vastly cheaper labor.  Companies from other parts of the world soon followed suit.  
Success in the zones led to a furthering of the opening policies in the mid 1980s when foreign 
investment was allowed in fourteen cities along the coast.   
All of these policies represented dramatic change in socialist China, and most led to rapid 
growth and rising incomes.  Inflation and corruption, however, were additional by-products.  
These concerns, combined with new individual freedoms, contributed to demonstrations and sit-
ins throughout May, 1989.  This willingness of ordinary people to confront the Chinese 
government was unprecedented, and unacceptable to the power elite.  These pressures 
culminated in the June 4th Tiananmen incident where the Chinese army attacked the students and 
others in order to clear the square and end the confrontation.  This event, not surprisingly, pushed 
some foreign countries away from further interactions with China for some time, and created a 
political crisis within China.  Speculation was rife that economic reform had come to an end.   
5 
 
Then, in January, 1992, Deng Xiaoping traveled to southern China to observe first-hand 
the SEZs and economic development there.  As a result of that trip, but after contentious debate 
and jockeying within the Chinese Communist Party, by March 1992 the leadership announced 
via national news that further reforms would be continued to maintain rapid growth (Vogel 2011, 
669-681).  Thus began a second phase of reforms in China that have led to world records of 
foreign investment, exports and growth of 10 percent or more throughout the 1990s and into the 
21st century.   
Deng used his vast power and networks to accomplish these significant changes, even 
though he was not technically the leader of the government during these years.  In 1978 Hua 
Guofeng held the positions of chairman of the party and premier.  From 1983 to 1988, Hu 
Yaobang was general secretary of the party and Li Xiannian was president with Zhao Ziyang 
serving as Premier, followed by Yang Shangkun as president (1988-92) with Li Peng as premiere 
(1987-98). When Jiang Zemin became president in 1993 at the 14th Party Congress, a 
regularized, ten-year term was established for the top leadership.  The end of lifetime 
appointments had been one of Deng’s goals for political reform (Vogel, 2011, p.687).  Serving 
with President Jiang was first Li Peng and then Zhu Rongji in the position of premiere.  The 
economy falls primarily under the Premier’s portfolio. 
 
Jiang Zemin Takes the Lead 
During Jiang’s leadership, reforms were characterized by further development of market 
institutions that would help guide the economy instead of planning as under Mao, or lose control 
leading to inflation, as during the first phase of reforms.  Key to this goal was developing 
modern banking and taxation systems.  Although already under development before Jiang 
became president, the major financial sector reforms were launched in 1994 (Wu, 2005, pp.222-
225; 269-274).   
In banking, the People’s Bank of China was designated as the central bank, much like the 
Federal Reserve Bank in the U.S., and the other banks were to be reformed to behave as profit-
seeking companies with incentive to make careful loan decisions.  The People’s Bank has the 
responsibility to set monetary and exchange rate policies to indirectly influence investment and 
consumption behavior.  While these changes have not been fully successful and are still far from 
complete in replacing top-down directives with indirect measures to influence market behavior, 
these steps have helped smooth out the booms and busts of growth and inflation experienced 
during the first phase of reform.   
In taxation, after years of a unified system, separate local and central tax bureaus were 
created to collect their respective tax revenues, and expenditure responsibilities were readjusted 
to reflect the new needs of the society.  The Central government’s fiscal responsibilities focused 
on national infrastructure projects, national defense, and redistribution priorities, while local 
6 
 
governments’ responsibilities focused on K-12 education, local infrastructure and promotion of a 
good business environment to create jobs for their constituents.    
 Housing reform took place during this period, transferring ownership of apartments to 
individuals in the urban areas.  Today there is a vibrant real estate market, although housing 
values have increased so much that many cannot afford to buy even a small condominium.  
Although land still cannot be privately owned, the rights to use land are sold for fixed time 
periods ranging from 50 to 70 years.  To reflect these changes, in 2004 the National People’s 
Congress incorporated the right of private property ownership into the Chinese constitution.2    
One of Jiang’s legacies was to develop the theory of the “Three Represents,” reportedly 
at least in part as a result of touring the more advanced southern and eastern areas of China’s 
development in 2000.3  The idea was that the CCP would no longer represent just the workers, 
soldiers and peasants as was the case under Mao, but would broaden its scope given new 
developments in Chinese society to include the “advanced productive forces, an advanced 
culture, and the interests of the majority of the people.  One of the groups included in the 
“majority of the people” were those who contributed in commercial ways to society, and 
therefore entrepreneurs in the private sector could be counted as productive members of society.  
They also then could become members of the Chinese Communist Party.  This was seen as a 
major ideological step in politically rationalizing the economic reforms.   
In terms of the international economy, under Jiang and especially Zhu Rongji, China 
became even more integrated into the production networks of Asia and beyond (Zhao and Zhang, 
2007).  As a center for manufacturing, China has held a trade surplus with many developed 
countries such as the U.S. and the E.U.  Approximately half of these exports from China 
originate in companies with foreign investment.  In another sign of normalizing economic 
relations and building a market economy, after many years of negotiation and revamping 
relevant laws and regulations to suit international norms, China joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 (Prime 2002).  Implementation of this agreement has opened the central 
and western parts of China to foreign investment, and has phased in new sectors where 
international competition is allowed.   
 Due to surplus labor in the agricultural sector, new opportunities in the cities and a 
relaxation of the prior household registration system or hukou, estimates of over 140 million 
people travel for temporary work, referred to as the “floating population.”   These are primarily 
people with permanent rural residences who travel to find work in manufacturing, construction 
or other services in urban areas. Since their official places of residence are in villages and towns, 
                                                          
2 China Endorses Private Property, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3509850.stm]; accessed December 6, 
2012. 
3[ http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html]; accessed October 17, 2012 
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they make up the majority of the informal urban sector in China.  Increasingly these people are 
settling permanently in their new urban locations.  
 The hukou policy and system continue to evolve, as the need for the labor services of 
rural people grow owing to the demands for factory, construction, and transportation workers in 
the burgeoning cities, especially in the coastal provinces of the east.  China has now crossed the 
50 percent threshold of urbanization, and the growth of cities and towns continues in step with 
the rapid economic growth and structural shift from farming to industry to service activities 
(Chan, 2012).  These temporary migrants are not entitled to the privileges and services afforded 
to city dwellers with non-agricultural and urban residential hukou status.  Such privileges as 
employment in the state sector, state-supported health services, and free education for their 
children are typically not available.  Temporary migrants in fact are second class citizens in a 
two-tiered system, and there are increasing calls for modification or even termination of this 
policy.  Yet the policy has served China well to ensure an almost endless supply of low-cost 
labor to man the factory jobs related to export-oriented industries and to keep the cost of 
construction and many other low-end service jobs in cities at a very low wages (Chan, 2009).  
This disparity between the two groups of citizens is one of the main reasons behind the rising 
gap in income.  
 Under Mao’s socialist leadership, which restricted labor mobility and private ownership, 
income inequality was very low.  The market reforms have led to a rising Gini coefficient from 
29.1 in 1981 to 42.5 in 2005, which is now on par with that of the United States which was 40.8 
in 2000.4  In addition to the inequalities arising from the hukou system in urban and rural areas, 
disparities between geographical regions have developed as the east coast was favored in terms 
of policy and historically had better endowments of capital, infrastructure and educated labor 
(Zhu and Wan 2012).  Beginning in 2000, the central government began a “Develop the West” 
program that channeled national government funding into infrastructure, resources, education 
and health in the western provinces and autonomous regions to begin to address the substantial 
geographic inequalities that have emerged (Chin 2004).  
 
Hu Jintao redefines progress 
  Building on the “Develop the West” goals, President Hu put forward a platform around 
building a “harmonious society.”  The 6th Plenum of the 16th Central Committee meeting of the 
CCP in the fall of 2002 issued “The Resolution on Some Issues in Building a Harmonious 
Society” (Herschler 2007).  Hu’s agenda can be thought of as a focus on social reforms to rebuild 
the social services that collapsed along with central planning, and to help those falling behind in 
income and employment options despite the rapid growth of output.  Central to this strategy is a 
phasing out of low-wage, labor intensive manufacturing for export in the coastal areas, replacing 
                                                          
4 World Bank Databank [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator]; accessed 6 December 2012. 
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this with higher value-added, higher wage production especially in central and western China, in 
addition to expanding domestic demand.   The goal is to generate domestic income and 
consumption so that China will be less dependent on exports and investment to drive growth.   
 Another part of the rebalancing effort is to invest in the quality of life aspects of the 
economy such as education, healthcare, retirement and the environment.  The rapid reforms that 
occurred in the first thirty years focused on production and not on services, and especially 
neglected household services as well as the safety net and welfare programs that governments 
typically provide.   Numerous experiments with reforms have taken place in these spheres during 
Hu’s leadership, and this approach was officially endorsed in the 12th Five-year Plan in March 
2011 (Roach 2012a).   
 Evidence of progress has been mixed.  Many analysts talk of lost opportunities under the 
Hu regime in terms of improving political institutions, the functioning of the market system, and 
the coverage of social programs (Anderlini 2012, Bhattacharya 2012, Rabinovitch 2012a).   
Nonetheless, there are signs of tentative success in some arenas.  For example, the share of 
exports has fallen as has China’s trade surplus.  Today China’s trade surplus is about 4.3% of 
GDP down from a high of almost 8% (Beattie and Ross, 2006).  This is probably largely due to 
decreases in foreign demand as a result of weak economies overseas, but still is moving China in 
the desired direction.  More importantly, perhaps, monthly growth figures for inland and western 
provinces are substantially higher than coastal areas in 2012.  For example, for the first 8 months 
of the year, Shanxi, Henan and Hunan grew 11.4, 14.9 and 14.9 percent respectively while 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong grew only 6.0, 2.1 and 7.3 respectively.5   One of the goals of 
the re-balancing is to help slow down, and possibly reverse, the growing unequal income 
distribution between households on the coast and those further inland.  These differentiated 
growth rates represent a step towards that goal.  Another piece of evidence of progress was that 
China’s ranking in the global competitiveness comparisons for health and basic education rose to 
35.6   Supporting this, recent reports on progress in pension coverage claim that over one-third of 
citizens are covered with a big push to cover more families quickly.7  
  
Feasible Policies for Pressing Challenges  
 Despite some evidence of re-balancing, China’s leaders are well aware of the small gains 
in this regard, as well as the many challenges facing further growth in its economy.  A World 
                                                          
5 National Bureau of Statistics of China, [www.stats.gov.cn], accessed September 25, 2012.  
6 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-13: Country Profile Highlights, p.8. 
[www.weforum.org], accessed October 8, 2012.   
7 “Pension system now covers 459 million people,” [http://english.caixin.com/2012-11-14/100460499.html]; 




Bank report, in cooperation with Chinese analysts, discusses a series of reform options in 
response to what it calls an inflection point in China’s growth (World Bank 2012).  Analysts in 
China have been involved in a lively debate on how likely it is that China would fall into a 
“middle income trap” where incomes stagnate, and what would be needed to avoid such a fate 
(Woo 2012).  How the next leaders decide to deal with the economy will profoundly affect 
China’s growth path and China’s relationship with the global economy.   
 To understand the nature of the growth barriers going forward, it is helpful to look at the 
factors that propelled growth so far.  Key growth variables that lead to rising living standards for 
economies include increasing the use of capital relative to labor, expanding exports, improving 
the efficiency of an economy through market reforms, and advancing the available technology.  
China has relied heavily on the first three.  Reforms have moved China from a planned economy 
to a semi-market one, improving overall economic efficiency.  China’s export growth has also 
been very successful.  As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), exports rose from less than 5 
percent in the 1970s to 31 percent in the 2000s (figure 1).  The linkages between exports and 
growth are many—tapping global demand and economies of scale, increasing efficiency through 
competition, earning foreign exchange to pay for needed inputs, raw materials, energy and 
technology, among others.  
 But the strongest contributor to growth in China has been high savings that funded 
investment combined with a slowing growth in population.  Population growth fell from 2 
percent in the 1970s to .6 in the 2000s, while savings grew to 46 percent of GDP and investment 
to over 40 percent (figure 1).  These trends raise the capital-output ratio throughout the economy, 
which directly raises living standards by increasing output per person.8   
 These are impressive numbers.  China’s challenge now is how to keep this going.  
Although China does not need to maintain a 10 percent growth rate going into future, a healthy 7 
to 8 percent will be necessary to employ the active labor force.  High savings and investment can 
support growth for some time to come, but the rate of growth would be expected to fall as 
development goes forward due to falling marginal productivity.  In other words, without access 
to new resources or improved inputs, or to technological change, additions to output fall over 
time.  To overcome this trend based on the growth model to date, a higher savings rate, more 
exports or a lower population growth rate would be required.  None of these are desirable, or 




                                                          







Figure 1: Factors Contributing to China’s Growth, averages by decade 
 
Note: Based on data from 1970-2011; savings is measured as gross national savings; investment 
is measured as gross capital formation; consumption is household final consumption expenditure.  
Source: World Bank, World Databank, [http://data.worldbank.org]; accessed November 8, 2012. 
  
 Decreasing the population growth rate is not desirable since it is so low already that the 
population has already begun to age.  In fact, the main discussion is when the one-child per 
family policy will be lifted, which is expected to raise the population growth rate some.  
Increasing the share of exports is very problematic.  China has a large trade surplus with 
mounting foreign exchange reserves that cannot be spent at home without undermining the 
currency value and creating inflation. World markets are saturated with Chinese goods, causing 
political tension with many trading partners.  Increasing the saving rate further is also not 
feasible.  Consumption as a share of GDP has fallen over time and is now very low—35 percent 
(figure 1).  Increasing the consumption share could be the next engine of China’s growth, but not 
if savings continue to be so high.  In addition, investment is already so high that many analysts 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
GDP growth 
(annual % change)
7.4 9.8 10.0 10.3 9.8
Savings (% GDP) 30.4 35.4 41.2 45.8 52.3
Investment 
(% GDP)
30.5 36.0 39.0 41.3 48.3
Consumption 
(% GDP)
60.6 50.0 44.0 39.7 34.5
Population 
Growth (annual % 
change)
2.0 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.5
Exports (% GDP) 4.7 11.8 19.6 31.1 30.5
Imports (% GDP) 4.8 12.3 17.5 26.5 26.5
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suspect that much of that investment is not used very efficiently and production overcapacity is 
already a problem. 
 The options, then, are two-fold:  1) move forward with reforms that would increase 
efficiency, such as promoting private business, modernizing the financial system and creating a 
market for land; and 2) increasing the technological base of the economy through innovation.  
Both of these improvements would add growth independent of the population, savings, 
investment or exports.   
 Academics and policy makers in China continue to discuss reform options; however, 
substantial change in policies or institutions appears to have stalled on many fronts and may be 
politically difficult to push forward.  For example, the financial and property sectors are highly 
controlled by government entities, and have been very lucrative for those involved.  Creating 
market reforms to make these sectors more competitive will entail sharing the profits much more 
broadly.   
 On the other hand, promoting innovation is politically easier in the sense that it moves 
China away from needing foreign investment and towards building itself into a world power.  
Indeed, innovation has been the talk of Beijing and one of the core elements of President Hu 
Jintao’s policy platform (McGregor 2010).  Described as “scientific development” and 
“indigenous innovation,” promoting technological progress has been one of the pillars of 
President Hu’s “harmonious society,” along with helping to develop the poorer areas of the 
country and build health and retirement systems to supplement the uncertainties that have 
intensified along with market development (Fewsmith 2004).  While innovation may not close 
income gaps, it would boost long-run growth.   
 In may be, however, that to spur innovation, reforms will need to come first. While the 
private sector is an engine of wealth creation, it is highly disadvantaged within the Chinese 
system in terms of its high cost of capital, poor protection of its assets, lack of access to certain 
business sectors and resources such as land, and even its legal status.  There is also a lack of 
consumer confidence in the safety of products generally, which likely puts a damper on 
consumers’ willingness to experiment with new products.  The stories of poor quality products, 
even dangerous products, sold in China (and abroad) abound (Gerth 2010).  Institutional 
oversight of products and some formal consumer protection will be needed.   
 Nonetheless enterprising people are everywhere in China, and many of them are making 
money by identifying goods and services that people want to buy.  But successful professionals 
and business people prefer in general to lay low, and will rarely agree to be quoted.  The fear of 
increased taxes or being targeted for corruption investigations are part of the landscape.  If one is 
successful, an attractive option is to take your wealth abroad where it will be safe from the 
uncertainties of the current political-economic system (Johnson 2012).  Buying property and 
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sending one’s children abroad for school are two popular ways for families of even modest 
means to invest abroad. 
 These concerns and trends are telling, and underscore the desirability of progressive 
change in China to support sustainable growth into the future.   
 
New Leaders, New Directions? 
 After a rebound from the 2008 global financial crisis, a gradual slowing has occurred in 
the economy beginning in 2010.  Figure 2 shows annual changes in gross domestic product from 
the year earlier by quarters.   These quarterly figures translated to annual growth of about 10 
percent in 2010, falling to 9 percent in 2011 and with an estimated 7 and a half percent in 2012.   
The quarter on quarter growth figures, however, show that growth averaged about 7.5 percent 
after the first quarter of 2012, suggesting that the decline had bottomed out (NBS).  The 
economic plans under Hu Jintao incorporated some slowing of growth due to re-directing 
resources to support social services, clean up the environment and invest in projects with longer-
run returns.  At the same time, the leadership does not want a so-called “hard landing,” meaning 
an adjustment where growth falls too far, too fast.    The economic problems in the U.S. and 
Europe have hurt exports and other business ventures for Chinese companies, which are no doubt 
partly to blame for this slowdown.  A recently released survey suggests that cuts in exports and 
construction have had a larger effect on the economy than previously thought, as shown in higher 
urban unemployment than the official figures reveal (Wall Street Journal 2012).   
 
Figure 2: China’s Quarterly GDP growth, year-on-year, 2010-2012 
Quarter 2010 2011 2012 
1st  11.9 9.7 8.1 
2nd 10.3 9.5 7.6 
3rd 9.6 9.1 7.4 
4th 9.8 8.9 7.5 est. 
Annual 
growth 
10.4 9.2 7.6 est. 
 
Source: NBS, [http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/Quarterlydata/]; accessed 
November 21, 2012.  
 
  If true, news that the economy was bottoming out must have been welcomed by the 
newly appointed leadership.  After spending billions of yuan for stimulus programs to counter 
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the 2008 financial crisis fall out, which exacerbated debt levels especially of local governments, 
spending even more on stimulus was no doubt not a happy prospect (Bhattacharya 2012).  In 
addition, moves to calm the hot property market risked slowing the economy, but the growth 
figures for the second half of 2012 indicate these policies were successful without a huge cost.    
 With the short-term growth issues seemingly under control, the leadership can focus on 
medium and long-term growth.  The Party speeches at the 18th National Congress re-counted 
economic successes over the last ten years, as would be expected, but also called for continued 
reform.  Growth targets were set in terms of incomes of both rural and urban residents, rather 
than overall output measures (Chang 2012).  Seemingly a subtle point, growth in output has been 
much faster than incomes over the years, depressing the share of consumption in total economic 
activity.  Again, an emphasis on consumers and households over producers would be a welcome, 
and many believe, necessary change.  With the economy recovering, presumably the political 
environment would be more conducive for re-instigating reform than if growth continued to 
slow. 
 Leading up to the leadership changes, the general consensus has been expected 
conservatism rather than risk-taking social change.  One line of reasoning is that none of these 
men would have made it to the top without being very, very careful.  One stark case in point is 
Bo Xilai, who met his demise going outside of the normal paths of power and change.   In 
another development, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, which serves as China’s 
Central Bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, has been viewed as a reformer in the midst of the conservative 
financial sector.  After ten years, he has been replaced without being promoted (Rabinovitch 
2012b).   
 On the other hand, among the top seven new leaders, there is a good deal of market 
economic expertise (Roach 2012b).  Li Keqiang, tapped to serve as premier, is a Ph.D. in 
economics and was part of the team working with the World Bank on the China 2030 report.  
Before his appointment to the Politboro Standing Committee, Li served on the Central 
Committee as the second most influential player on the economy after Wen Jiabao (Rabinovitch 
2012a).  So Li has had extensive experience running the economy, including navigating the 
crisis, as well as first-hand analysis of what the economy needs to sustain growth.  Wang Qishan 
has substantial experience in the finance sector and is considered a global player in banking.  
Several others have served as high-level leaders in major urban centers, giving them first-hand 
economic experience as well.  In addition, the new President, Xi Jinping, is thought to have 
sufficient power to push through and implement major economic and social reforms, and that he 
understands the importance for China to do so now.   For the last couple of years he has studied 
the system in Singapore as a model of a country with single party rule but with a flexible, open 
market economy (Wong and Ansfield 2012).  His emphasis on anti-corruption in his initial 
speeches during the Congress may also be important, as reforms would have to overcome strong 
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vested interests.9   Singapore is a model to emulate with regard to strategies to keep corruption in 
check as well.   
 Tellingly, in early December in his first major trip after winning power, Xi Jinping 
traveled to southern China to visit the SEZs where he talked about the necessity for reform 
(Wong 2012).  Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was part of the top leadership team that oversaw the 
establishment of the zones in the early 1980s.  Hence Xi is familiar with the history, successes 
and problems relating to China’s opening and its relation with building markets.  Reminiscent of 
Deng’s southern journey that re-enforced China’s reform path in 1992, Xi’s trip is highly 
symbolic.  Xi invoked nationalism by talking about China’s national revival as the “Chinese 
dream.”  The implication is that China’s success as a rising power will depend on moving 
forward with market reforms.  In China’s context, this is a significant sign.   
 Since one of the suspected stumbling blocks to change has been the ability of vested 
interests in the state sector to gain advantages and keep competition at bay, a possible path to 
challenging these interests could be to put the international aspects of reform out front.  
International competition could indirectly create more competition in the domestic arena.  Xi’s 
visit to Shenzhen indicates he is emphasizing more opening of the economy, while using China’s 
national strength as a rationale.    Hence more opening could be his strategy for introducing 
domestic reforms as well. 
 Three parts of the international reforms include encouraging more Chinese firms to invest 
abroad, establishing the yuan as an international currency, and establishing a domestic stock 
exchange where foreign firms, and Chinese firms that incorporated abroad, could issue shares 
within China.   All three of these policies have the potential to create competition for Chinese 
companies because they level the playing field and integrate China further with global markets.   
 Since 1999 when China’s Going Global Strategy was launched, outward foreign 
investment has steadily increased.   By 2011 total outward investment reportedly reached over 
$424 billion, after registering only $29 billion by 2002 (Hu and Zhao 2012).  At first the 
investments focused on natural resources but increasingly have branched out into all major 
sectors.  Once operating beyond home borders, these companies face global competition head on.  
These experiences both help Chinese managers understand markets better, and learn what could 
be improved at home to promote business development.   
 With respect to the currency, China has pushed for more international transactions to be 
settled wholly in yuan as a step towards gaining legitimacy for the yuan as a reserve currency.  
To facilitate this, off-shore yuan markets have been set up in Hong Kong, with Taiwan and 
Singapore, and possibly London, to follow (Grant 2012).  International bonds denominated in 
yuan, “dim sum” bonds, are also gaining traction.  Officials in British Columbia, Canada, are 
considering offering yuan bonds as a way to diversify away from U.S. and Canadian dollars 
                                                          
9 “China’s Leadership Transition,” Financial Times, [http://www.ft.com/leadership], accessed November 26, 2012.  
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(Law 2012).  Large foreign and Chinese companies are also issuing them as China’s domestic 
bond market is still closed to foreigners.  The currency is trading in wider bands over time, 
prompting companies to consider hedging the volatility of currency values that is expected to 
follow (Wei 2012).  Full convertibility and market value determination are probably still a ways 
off, but these moves are helping foreign companies do business in China as well as Chinese 
companies doing business abroad. 
 Finally, a new stock exchange is in the works where foreign companies could list and 
therefore have access to the Chinese capital markets.  This International Board would allow 
foreign firms access to the Chinese capital markets and create competition for shares with the 
existing domestic A and B share markets (Ni 2012).  Many countries simply open their capital 
markets to foreign portfolio investors, but Chinese policy makers want to prevent potential “hot 
money” flows by controlling the opening of its capital account.  In lieu of this, establishing an 
International Board would create competitive pressure for Chinese domestic firms to perform up 
to global expectations as well as be more transparent about performance and management.   
 At this point, how much the new leadership team is giving lip-service to change without 
the ability or intent to change, is difficult to know.  The leaders understand what needs to be 
done—the question is whether the difficult changes that will disenfranchise powerful people can 
be pushed through successfully.   Given the urgency for change and the knowledge that this 
urgency is well-known both among China’s citizens and at China’s highest levels of leadership, 
it is more likely that serious attempts to deal with China’s challenges will occur than for those in 
the spotlight to paper over citizens’ concerns.  Surveys show that more access to jobs and the 
means to insure against uncertainties matter a great deal to people in China (Easterlin 2012).  
The central government’s goal to provide a reasonably comfortable income level to all 
households is a broad-based goal with this in mind.  The next step will be to flesh out the 
specifics of the policies intended to move China forward.  Even if the new leadership utilizes 
more opening as a path to reform, change in the domestic economy will be needed eventually.  
To evaluate the likelihood of success, look for signs of the establishment of private sector 
legitimacy, a decline in state-sector monopoly power, and legal bases for the reform policies.  
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